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Workers' Compensation Law. American Power Conversion v.
Benny's, Inc., 740 A.2d 1265 (R.I. 1999). The Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that under Rhode Island General Laws sec-
tion 28-34-8, a statute that requires the last employer to pay total
compensation for employees' injuries sustained during employ-
ment, the last employer is "made liable" for the injury when it
either admits to the liability or is found liable by an order or decree
of a court.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On November 2, 1995, employee David Sherman (Sherman)
sustained an injury while he was in the employment of plaintiff
American Power Conversion (American).' Because Sherman sus-
tained his injury while employed by American, American filed a
memorandum of agreement (MOA) accepting liability for the in-
jury.2 However, American claimed that the injury was initially
sustained while Sherman was in the employment of defendant
Benny's, Inc. (Benny's), a prior employer of Sherman.3 American
then filed a petition for apportionment pursuant to Rhode Island
General Laws section 28-34-84 and named Benny's as liable for
Sherman's injuries.5 Benny's moved to dismiss the apportionment
petition.6
The trial justice for the Workers' Compensation Court dis-
missed the apportionment motion based on the fact that American
had not been "made liable" as dictated by section 28-34-8, but had
unilaterally accepted liability by entering into the MOA.7 The trial
justice believed that section 28-34-8 requires a judicial determina-
tion assessing liability to be a prerequisite to seeking relief under
section 28-34-8.8 American appealed to the Appellate Division of
the Workers' Compensation Court, contending that the trial justice
erred in her assessment of section 28-34-8. 9 The Appellate Divi-
1. See American Power Conversion v. Benny's, Inc., 740 A.2d 1265, 1267 (R.I.
1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-34-8 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
5. See American Power Conversion, 740 A.2d at 1267.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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sion of the Workers' Compensation Court upheld the trial justice's
decision with the same reasoning.' 0 American appealed from this
judgment."
ANAiysis AND HOLDING
In order to determine whether American was precluded from
seeking apportionment under section 28-34-8, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court looked to the language of the statute. 12 The court
determined that where the statute is unambiguous and expresses
a clear and sensible meaning, "this court must interpret the stat-
ute literally and give the words of the statute their plain and ordi-
nary meanings."' 3  However, when as here, the statutory
provisions are unclear or ambiguous, the court examines the stat-
ute in its entirety in order to "glean the intent and purpose of the
legislature. . . 'keeping in mind [the] nature, object, language and
arrangement' of the provisions to be construed."' 4
Section 28-34-8 provides:
The total compensation due shall be recovered from the em-
ployer who last employed the employee in the employment to
the nature of which the disease was due and in which it was
contracted. If, however, the disease was contracted while the
employee was in the employment of a prior employer, the em-
ployer who is made liable for the total compensation as pro-
vided by this section may petition the workers' compensation
court for an apportionment of the compensation among the
several employers who since the contraction of the disease
shall have employed the employee in the employment to the
nature of which the disease was due. The apportionment
shall be proportioned to the time the employee was employed
in the service of the employers and shall be determined only
after a hearing, notice of the time and place of which shall
have been given to every employer alleged to be liable for any
portion of the compensation. If the court finds that any por-
10. See id. The Appellate Division used Black's Law Dictionary to define the
term "made" in section 28-34-8's "made liable" as, "to have required or compelled"
the employer to compensate the employ. Id. at 1267-68 n.3.
11. See id. at 1268.
12. See id.
13. Id. (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 647 A.2d
1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996)).
14. Id. (quoting In re Advisory to the Governor, 668 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I.
1996)).
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tion of the compensation is payable by an employer prior to
the employer who is made liable for the total compensation as
provided by this section, it shall make an award accordingly
in favor of the last employer, and that award may be enforced
in the same manner as an award for compensation. 15
Because the court found section 28-34-8 ambiguous as to
whether an employer must engage in an adversary proceeding so
that it can be "made liable" by the Workers' Compensation Court,
the court examined the statute in its entirety in order to ascertain
the intent of the legislature and the statute itself.16 The court then
turned to Esmond Mills, Inc. v. American Woolen Co.,17 for a previ-
ous discussion on the intended purpose of section 28-34-8.18
The supreme court found that the Appellate Division's inter-
pretation of section 28-34-8 was contrary to the statute's intent. 19
The supreme court instead agreed with the dissent in the Appel-
late Division's decision, that the statute serves two purposes: (1) to
provide monetary assistance to a qualified employee in a speedy
manner to provide for successive hearings, and (2) to provide for
successive hearings. 20 The supreme court believed that the Appel-
late Division failed to consider the underlying intent of section 28-
34-8, which is to provide monetary assistance to a qualified em-
ployee in a speedy manner.21 It believed that if an employer must
engage in an adversary proceeding so that it can be "made liable"
by the Workers' Compensation Court, the intent of providing mon-
etary assistance in a speedy manner would be severely hindered. 22
15. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-34-8 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
16. See American Power Conversion, 740 A.2d at 1268 (citing In re Advisory to
the Governor, 668 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I. 1996)).
17. 68 A.2d 920 (R.I. 1949).
18. 18.
[Tihe legislature evidently considered it advisable in the interest of the
employee and in the speedy enforcement of his rights that he should be
allowed to collect all compensation then due from the employer for whom
he was working when he became incapacitated; and that such employer
should then have the right to ask for proportionate apportionment from
those employers for whom the employee had previously worked in the
same employment and had contracted or had been exposed to the occupa-
tional disease which finally caused his disability.
See American Power Conversion, 740 A.2d at 1268.
19. Id. (quoting Esmond Mills, Inc. v. American Woolen Co., 68 A.2d 920, 923
(R.I. 1949)).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1268-69.
SURVEY SECTION
In this case American did not dispute whether it was partially
liable for the injuries suffered by Sherman. 23 However, American
filed a MOA to pay the injured employee his total compensation.24
The statute governing the filing of a MOA provides in pertincnt
part: "Upon the filing of the memorandum of agreement with the
department, the memorandum shall be as binding upon the party
filing the memorandum as a preliminary determination, order, or
decree."25
In the court's judgment, section 28-34-8 does not contain
mandatory language that a court must determine liability; thus it
is appropriate to allow the use of a MOA to fulfill the legislature's
intent to expedite compensation payments to an injured em-
ployee.26 Therefore, the supreme court remanded the case to the
Workers' Compensation Court for a determination of liability be-
tween American and Benny's. 27
CONCLUSION
In American Power Conversion v. Benny's, Inc., the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court correctly held that American Power Conver-
sion should be able to apportion its liability to other previous
employers of an injured employee pursuant to section 28-34-8 of
the Rhode Island General Laws. Because the workers' compensa-
tion statutes are intended to provide injured employees with a
speedy avenue to compensation for their injuries, an employer
should not have to seek a judicial determination that it is "made
liable" for the injury before it can give compensation to the em-
ployee and seek apportionment from the injured employee's prior
employer.
B. Jason Erb
23. See id. at 1269.
24. See id.
25. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-1(e) (1956) (1995 Reenactment)).
26. See id.
27. See id.
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Workers' Compensation Law. Brooks v. Dockside Seafood, 740
A.2d 1277 (R.I. 1999). When reviewing a petition for benefits due
to latent or undiscovered injuries, the Workers' Compensation
Court is to apply section 28-35-57 of the Rhode Island General
Laws. Section 28-35-57 sets forth a two year statute of limitations
that commences when the claimant becomes aware, or could rea-
sonably be held to have been aware, of the full impact and signifi-
cance of the pain that caused him or her to be unable to work.
In Brooks v. Dockside Seafood,' the Rhode Island Supreme
Court determined that under section 28-35-57 of the Rhode Island
General Laws, the statute of limitations begins to run on latent or
undetected injuries once the claimant knows, or should have rea-
sonably known, that the claimant's pain and injury were the result
of her employment. 2 In Brooks, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
stated that the Workers' Compensation Court should base their de-
cision on the claimant's injury and subsequent incapacity rather
than the mere presence of pain.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Irene Brooks (Brooks) was employed as a meat wrapper at
Dockside Seafood (Dockside), a retail fish market, from 1986 until
leaving work due to pain in her wrists in November of 1994.4 In
November of 1994, Brooks consulted a physician and was diag-
nosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.5 In March of 1995,
Brooks underwent carpal tunnel release on both her left and right
wrists.6 Brooks then petitioned the Workers' Compensation Court
(WCC) for disability benefits.7 The WCC found that Brooks had
suffered a loss of earning capacity as a result of her employment at
Dockside and awarded her partial benefits from November 28,
1994 through March 2, 1995, and total benefits from March 3,
1. 740 A.2d 1277 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id. at 1281.
3. See id. at 1282.
4. See id. at 1278.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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1995.8 However, on September 22, 1995, the WCC found that
Brooks' inability to work had ended and discontinued her benefits. 9
In March of 1996, Brooks consulted Dr. Andrew Green, who
found her to have "ulnar nerve compression.., causally related to
her previous work activities as a meat wrapper." 10 In June of
1996, after consulting a third physician, Brooks was diagnosed
with ulnar neuropathy in her left side and tendinitis in her left
shoulder, once again found to be caused by her work at Dockside. 11
Surgery was recommended and Brooks filed a petition to have her
prior decree reviewed. 12 On October 7, 1996, the WCC denied her
petition for review.' 3 Brooks appealed this decision and requested
a trial.' 4 Brooks then filed a second petition which claimed bene-
fits for her left elbow and shoulder injuries caused by her job at
Dockside. 15
On July 18, 1997, a trial judge denied and dismissed both peti-
tions. 16 The trial judge found that the petition to review failed to
prove that Brooks was again incapacitated due to injuries sus-
tained in November of 1994.17 The trial judge also found that the
original petition did not conform to the requirements of section 28-
35-61 of the Rhode Island General Laws, requiring that a decree
under review be amended within months of it becoming final.' 8
Brooks appealed to the Appellate Division of the WCC on July
21, 1997, arguing that the trial court was incorrect in finding her
petitions barred by section 28-35-61.19 Brooks asserted that the
proper standard was section 28-35-57 of the Rhode Island General
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1278-79.
14. See id. at 1279.
15. See id. The two petitions were consolidated for trial.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. The trial judge found that Brooks' injuries to her right shoulder
and left elbow had been known to her at the commencement of her first petition in
March 1995.
19. See id. See also R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-61(a)(2) (1956) (1995 Reenact-
ment) (providing that the Workers' Compensation Court may vacate, amend, or
modify any final decree entered within a period of six months prior to the filing of
the petition if the petition does not accurately and completely set forth and de-
scribe the nature and location of all injuries sustained by the employee).
20001 839
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Laws, which provides a general limitation, stating that a claimant
has a two-year period to bring a claim for compensation. 20 On May
26, 1998, the Appellate Division denied Brooks' appeal and af-
firmed the decision of the trial court regarding both petitions.21
Following the Appellate Division's ruling, Brooks petitioned the
Rhode Island Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was
granted.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In Brooks, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed the sole
issue of "whether the Appellate Division erred as a matter of law in
holding that Brooks' original petition was barred by the six-month
time limitation in section 28-35-61."22 Brooks asserted that sec-
tion 28-35-61 did not apply to her original petition filed in 1996.23
After finding that section 28-35-61 was both clear and unambigu-
ous, the supreme court found that it provided a mechanism for the
WCC to amend any decree procured in a fraudulent manner. 24 Ad-
ditionally, the court found that contrary to the Appellate Division's
finding, "section 28-35-61 is not a statute of limitation, nor is it a
statute of repose."25 The crux of Brooks' appeal was her original
petition, which enumerated injuries to her left elbow and left
shoulder. 26 Brooks maintained that it was not until March 13,
1996, one year after the initial benefits decree had been entered,
that she consulted her doctor once again due to increasing pain in
her left elbow and shoulder.27 It was only after this consultation
and her subsequent diagnosis of "ulnar nerve compression ...
causally related to her previous work activities" that she filed the
original petition. 28
The Rhode Island Supreme Court dismissed the Appellate Di-
vision's reasoning that Brooks' situation was intended to be gov-
20. See id.
21. See id. The Appellate Division held that the trial court did not err in ap-
plying section 28-35-61 of the Rhode Island General Laws.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 1280. See also Luzzi v. Imondi, 198 A.2d 671 (R.I. 1964) (stating
that the language of section 28-25-61 is such that it is not open to interpretation as
it conveys a plain meaning).
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
erned by section 28-35-61.29 The court determined that section 28-
35-61 is not a statute of limitation.30 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that Brooks was not required to file a petition detailing
changes to the nature or location of her injuries within six months
of the final decree of the initial pretrial order.3 1 The court further
held that section 28-35-57 is applicable when determining the
timeliness of an original claim for compensation. 32 Section 28-35-
57 provides a two-year statue of limitations for filing petitions "af-
ter the occurrence or manifestation of the injury or incapacity."33
Section 28-25-57 further states that the time for filing begins to
run for "latent or undiscovered" injuries only after the claimant
knew or could reasonably been aware of the existence of the injury
and its relation to her employment. 34
The court applied section 28-35-57 to Brooks' appeal, conclud-
ing that Brooks became incapacitated due to the ulnar neuropathy
only after her first claim had been litigated.35 Specifically, the
court concluded "the manifestation of an injury and the consequent
incapacity, not the mere presence of pain, should be the primary
consideration for the WCC when reviewing a petition for bene-
fits."36 Thus, the statute of limitations did not begin to run on
Brooks' claim until such time that she knew, or could reasonably
have known, that the pain was casually related to injuries sus-
tained while employed at Dockside.37
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in claims for bene-
fits before the Workers' Compensation Court concerning latent or
undiscovered injuries, the applicable statute is section 28-35-57 of
the Rhode Island General Laws. The statute of limitations does not
29. See id.
30. See id. at 1281. The Appellate Division had cited language where the leg-
islature had recognized that "certain types of injuries may not immediately mani-
fest themselves" and that § 28-35-61 allows the parties to "relitigate the nature
and location of the employee's injuries for a period of six (6) months after the time
an actual decree was entered."
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-57 (a)).
34. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-57 (b)).
35. See id. at 1282.
36. Id.
37. See id.
20001
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begin to toll until the claimant is aware, or could reasonably have
been aware, that his or her pain bears a causal relationship to
their employment. Thus, the crucial inquiry for the Workers' Com-
pensation Court is the point at which claimant's injury manifests
itself as an inability to work rather than a mere pain.
Shannon M. Garvey
SURVEY SECTION
Workers' Compensation Law. Donnelly v. Town of Lincoln, 730
A.2d 5 (R.I. 1999). When benefits are awarded in a workers' com-
pensation case, the claimant need not request interest in order to
receive it because the' raise-or-waive rule is inapplicable to all
cases governed by sections 9-21-10 or 28-35-12 of the Rhode Island
General Laws. Additionally, where a municipality voluntarily
joins the workers' compensation system, it waives its sovereign im-
munity and is therefore not insulated from an award of interest in
workers' compensation cases.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 13, 1991, Christopher Donnelly (Christopher)
was undergoing training in preparation to be a police officer for the
Town of Lincoln when he died of a cardiac arrhythmia.' His wife,
Susan Donnelly (Susan), filed a petition with the Workers' Com-
pensation Commission for benefits on January 27, 1992.2 This pe-
tition was denied approximately one month later, and Susan filed a
claim for a trial.3
A trial was held in the Workers' Compensation Court on Au-
gust 31, 1992, and October 2, 1992.4 The Workers' Compensation
Court determined that Christopher was not an employee of the
town at the time of his death, and a decree denying benefits was
entered on October 13, 1992. 5 Susan appealed this decision and on
August 2, 1993, the parties presented oral arguments to the Appel-
late Division.6 The Appellate Division did not issue a final decree
until five years later, when it granted death benefits to Christo-
pher's estate on August 7, 1998. 7
Due to the inordinate delay, on August 22, 1997, Susan's attor-
ney filed a motion seeking twelve percent interest on the award of
benefits pursuant to section 28-35-12 of the Rhode Island General
Laws.8 Thereafter, the Appellate Division awarded death benefits
to Christopher's estate retroactive from September 13, 1991, but
1. See Donnelly v. Town of Lincoln, 730 A.2d 5, 6 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 7; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-12(c) (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
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did not address the award of any interest on those benefits.9 Su-
san objected and on June 17, 1998, the Appellate Court refused to
reopen the decree. 10 On August 7, 1998, the final decree was en-
tered and Susan filed a petition with the Rhode Island Supreme
Court for certiorari." On October 22, 1998, the petition for certio-
rari was granted. 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The central issue addressed by the Donnelly court was
whether or not Susan was required to request interest at the time
of trial in order for interest to be awarded on the workers' compen-
sation benefits. 13 Susan contended that the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act mandates that interest be included in a retroactive award
of benefits.14 The Town of Lincoln (the Town) argued that the
raise-or-waive rule precluded Susan from now requesting
interest. 15
The Town's argument rested on a decision made by the Appel-
late Division on November 9, 1992, after the Appellate Division
was directed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court to clarify when
the waive-or-raise rule would be applied for all future workers'
compensation cases.' 6 The Appellate Division's rule required that
"in the future, interest will be deemed waived unless requested at
trial. . ...17
As an initial matter, the Rhode Island Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Town's argument was inapplicable to the present
case since Susan's trial was completed one month before the raise-
or-waive rule was stated by the Appellate Division.", However,
the court elaborated that pursuant to sections 9-21-10 and 28-35-
12(c) of the Rhode Island General Laws, the waive-or-raise rule
9. See Donnelly, 730 A.2d at 7.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 8.
14. See id. at 7.
15. See id.
16. See Conrad v. State, 592 A.2d 858, 860 (R. 1991).
17. Donnelly, 730 A.2d at 8.
18. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
would be inapplicable regardless of whether the rule was stated
before or after Susan's trial.19
Under section 9-21-10, interest shall be added at the rate of
twelve percent per annum on any civil action resulting in a verdict
or decision for pecuniary damages.20 Section 28-35-12(c) provides
that the Workers' Compensation Court "shall award to the em-
ployee interest at the rate per annum provided in § 9-21-10....-21
Thus, the court held that the claimant would not need to raise the
issue of interest at trial in order to preserve interest because the
applicable statutes specifically provide for a mandatory application
of interest.22 As a result, it was held to be unnecessary to request
the interest in order to receive it in all cases governed by section
28-35-12(c) or section 9-21-10.23
The Town next argued that, as a municipality, it was immune
from the payment of interest. 24 The supreme court ruled that the
Town waived its immunity by voluntarily joining the workers' com-
pensation system and is responsible for the pre-judgment inter-
est.25 The court also held that the Town may fairly be held to pay
the interest because although the Town was not responsible for the
Appellate Division's delay, the Town used the funds and earned
interest on them during that five-year period. 26
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that sections 28-
35-12(c) and 9-21-10 of the Rhode Island General Laws provide for
interest to automatically be calculated and added to a judgment
when appropriate. Therefore, the raise-or-waive rule is inapplica-
ble to all cases governed by sections 28-35-12(c) or 9-21-10. Addi-
tionally, a town which voluntarily joins the workers' compensation
system, and in return receives the advantages of the system, has
19. See id. at 8-9.
20. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-10 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
21. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-12(c) (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
22. See Donnelly, 730 A.2d at 9.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 10.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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waived its sovereign immunity and is therefore vulnerable to an
award of interest.
Melissa Coulombe Beauchesne
SURVEY SECTION
Workers' Compensation Law. Lambert v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc.,
723 A.2d 777 (R.I. 1999). In the event that the claimant of work-
ers' compensation benefits has not worked for the thirteen weeks
prior to the week of his incapacity because of an occupational in-
jury, the average weekly wage of the claimant will be calculated on
the basis of the amount that he earned during the thirteen weeks
immediately preceding the last day of his employment.
In Lambert v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc.,' the court addressed how
workers' compensation benefits are to be calculated when the
claimant has not worked for the thirteen weeks prior to the period
that he has made a workers' compensation claim. The governing
statute, section 28-33-20 of the Rhode Island General Laws, does
not expressly address this issue. Therefore, the court held that
when a claimant's failure to work for the thirteen weeks prior to
his injury is involuntary, benefits should be calculated on the basis
of the amount that he earned during the thirteen weeks immedi-
ately preceding the last day of his employment.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Howard Lambert (Lambert) worked for Stanley Bostitch, Inc.
(Bostitch) from 1977 to June of 1995.2 During this time, Lambert
held a number of different positions at Bostitch.3 During the pe-
riod of 1986 or 1987 to 1995, Lambert held the position of a wire
winder. 4 In 1994, Lambert consulted a physician because he began
experiencing pain and numbness in both hands.5 In February of
1995, Lambert injured his right wrist while lifting weights during
his leisure time.6 Lambert continued to work, but finally sought
medical treatment on or about June 30, 1995, when the pain in his
wrist increased. 7 He consulted Dr. A. Louis Mariorenzi (Mari-
orenzi), who determined that Lambert's wrist was fractured.8
1. 723 A.2d 777 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id. at 779.
3. See id.
4. See id. See also id. at 779 n.1 (outlining the different duties of a wire
winder to include: hoisting 280 pound spools of wire onto a machine, pushing the
spools of wire by hand on a tram, filling a vat with glue and using shears to cut a
thousand pound pulley).
5. See id. at 779.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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Mariorenzi placed Lambert's wrist in a cast and instructed him not
to return to work.9
Mariorenzi gave Lambert permission to return back to work
after removing his cast in September of 1995.10 However, Bostich
refused to let Lambert return at this time."I Lambert continued to
experience pain in his right wrist and began to experience pain in
his left wrist, so Mariorenzi referred him to Dr. Gary A. L'Europa
(L'Europa).12 L'Europa concluded that there were nerve abnor-
malities consistent with carpel tunnel syndrome, but did not deter-
mine the cause. 13 Lambert was then examined by Dr. Arnold-
Peter C. Weiss (Weiss).14 On October 19, 1995, Weiss reported
that Lambert was suffering from work-related bilateral carpal tun-
nel syndrome, which was aggravated by Lambert's non-work-re-
lated activities. 15 After giving Lambert a cortisone injection in his
right wrist, Weiss permitted Lambert to return to work on the con-
ditions that he wear a splint at all times and not lift more than five
pounds. 16 Bostitch again refused Lambert's offer to return to
work.17
On December 4, 1995, Weiss performed surgery on Lambert's
left wrist and on his right wrist on March 4, 1996.18 Lambert was
discharged from Weiss' care on June 25, 1996, and was given per-
mission to return back to work without any restrictions. 19 At this
time, Bostitch employed Abacus Management Group to have Lam-
bert examined by Dr. Gregory J. Austin (Austin).20 Austin con-
cluded that the carpal tunnel syndrome was primarily work-
related. 21
Lambert sought workers' compensation benefits, claiming a
disability at or about the time of his surgery on December 4,
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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1995.22 The case was heard on four separate occasions before a
trial judge of the Workers' Compensation Court.23 Although Lam-
bert was not allowed to testify why he did not return to work as a
wire winder, Bostitch did stipulate that Lambert attempted to re-
turn to work and that Bostitch would not allow him to do so.24 The
trial judge held that Lambert was partially disabled from Decem-
ber 4, 1995, through June 25, 1996, but denied and dismissed his
claims for benefits. 25 The denial and dismissal of benefits claims
was based on the fact that Lambert had failed to convince the
court, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that he suffered a
loss of earnings during that time as a result of a work-related acci-
dent.26 Furthermore, the court found that Lambert failed to show
that he had earned any wages for the thirteen weeks prior to his
disability claim, upon which the disability benefits would be calcu-
lated pursuant to the statute.27
Lambert appealed to the Appellate Division of the Workers'
Compensation Court, arguing that the trial justice's holding was
erroneous because he calculated Lambert's disability benefits inac-
curately.28 Lambert argued that the governing statute mandates
that his earning capacity be calculated using the thirteen weeks
prior to his leaving the employment of Bostitch in June of 1995,
and not the thirteen weeks prior to his surgery on December 4,
1995, at which time he was unemployed.29 The Appellate Division
reversed the trial court's decision on the basis that the formula set
22. See id.
23. Those dates include March 26, 1996, April 11, 1996, May 24, 1996 and
August 27, 1996. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 779-80.
28. See id. at 780.
29. See id. The governing statute is R.I. Gen. Laws section 28-33-20, which
states in pertinent part:
For purposes of this chapter, the average weekly wage shall be ascer-
tained as follows:
For full-time or regular employees, by dividing the gross wages ...
earned by the injured worker in employment by the employer in whose
service he or she in injured during the thirteen (13) calendar weeks in
which he or she was injured, by the number of calendar weeks during
which, or any portion of which, the worker was actually employed by that
employer.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-20 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
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forth in the statute was not the only governing method of deter-
mining earning capacity.30 The Appellate Division agreed with
Lambert that the thirteen weeks prior to his leaving Bostitch in
June of 1995 could be the proper measure of his earning capacity
for workers' compensation purposes. 3 1 However, the Appellate Di-
vision only required Bostitch to pay Lambert fifty percent of his
weekly benefits, finding that Lambert's employment with Bostitch
was only a fifty percent contributing factor to his carpal tunnel
syndrome.32
Both parties appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
Lambert alleged that the Appellate Division erred in finding that
his employment at Bostitch was only fifty percent contributable to
his condition and that the court did not have authority, or acted in
excess of its authority, to award him only fifty percent of his bene-
fits.33 Bostitch argued that Lambert was not entitled to any bene-
fits because he did not prove an earning capacity within the
statutorily required period. 34
ANALYsis AND HOLDING
Determination of Earning Capacity
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that, under
Rhode Island General Laws section 28-33-20(a)(1), "weekly bene-
fits are calculated by adding together the employee's wages for the
thirteen weeks prior to injury, and then dividing by the number of
weeks worked during the thirteen week period."36 However, the
statute does not address situations in which the claimant has not
earned any wages in the thirteen weeks preceding his
incapacitation.3 6
The court noted that in three earlier cases, it previously ad-
dressed the issue of awarding workers' compensation benefits
where the claimant had not earned any wages for the thirteen
30. See Lambert, 723 A.2d at 780.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 781.
SURVEY SECTION
weeks prior to the date of disability.37 However, the court distin-
guished Lambert's situation, whose failure to earn wages was due
to his involuntary unemployment.38 The court determined that
Lambert was entitled to earnings because the purpose of workers'
compensation statutes and weekly workers' compensation benefits
is to provide the claimant with an allowance for his loss of earning
capacity as a result of his work-related injury.39 To achieve this
purpose, the statute "'is to be liberally construed to effect its benev-
olent purposes.'" 40 Therefore, the court held that it would not be in
line with the purpose behind the workers' compensation statute to
deny Lambert benefits merely because the statute does not provide
for his situation.41
The court noted that the Workers' Compensation Court has
the authority to interpret and apply a statute when necessary to
effectuate benefits. However, the court also found that the work-
ers' compensation statutes42 confers to the Appellate Division the
discretion to interpret the Workers' Compensation Act.43 Accord-
ingly, the Appellate Division here properly construed the statute to
award Lambert benefits based upon his earnings during the thir-
teen weeks preceding his last day of employment.44
Apportionment of Benefits
The court stated that while the trial judge did not determine
the extent of Bostich's liability for Lambert's injury, the Appellate
37. See id. at 781-82. See also St. Pierre v. Fulflex, Inc., 493 A.2d 817 (R.I.
1985) (denying claimant's benefits because fact that claimant was laid off before
the date of his disability precluded him from showing earning capacity); Aguiar v.
Control Power Indus., Inc., 496 A.2d 147 (R.I. 1985) (sustaining denial of benefits
to a claimant who waited four years after his injury to file his claim, at which time
he was employed by a different employer); Mullaney v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 520 A.2d
141 (R.I. 1987) (holding that an employee who voluntarily retires from the work
force has voluntarily surrended the capacity to earn wages).
38. See Lambert, 723 A.2d at 781. Specifically, the court called Lambert's in-
voluntary reason an "occupational disease." See id.
39. See id. at 780-81.
40. Id. at 782 (quoting Bailey v. American Stores, Inc., 610 A.2d 117, 120 (R.I.
1992).
41. See id.
42. Specifically, the court mentions R.I. Gen. Laws section 28-35-28 (1956)
(1995 Reenactment) as conferring power to the Appellate Division to review the
Workers' Compensation Court's findings. See id.
43. See Lambert, 723 A.2d at 782.
44. See id.
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Division found that the medical evidence showed the injury to be
at least partially due to Lambert's employment with Bostich.45
Section 28-35-28(b) of the Rhode Island General Laws allows the
Appellate Division to review factual findings of the trial judge and
reverse them for clear error.46 On the basis of this evidence, the
court upheld the apportionment of benefits made by the Appellate
Division, stating that it would not revisit an award based on suffi-
cient evidence in the record.47 However, the court made clear that
it was not endorsing an automatic fifty-fifty percentage apportion-
ment of the responsibility for the payment of the workers' compen-
sation benefits to the claimant. 48 Rather, where neither party
presented specific opinion evidence regarding the percentage of lia-
bility, "the Appellate Division may make a reasonable approtion-
ment based on reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the
evidence presented."49
CONCLUSION
When a person claiming workers' compensation benefits has
not worked for the thirteen weeks prior to his incapacitation due to
an involuntary occupational disease, his benefits will be calculated
based upon the thirteen weeks immediately preceding his last day
of employment. Furthermore, the Appellate Division may make a
reasonable apportionment of benefits based upon the totality of ev-
idence presented.
Melissa Coulombe Beauchesne
45. See id. at 783.
46. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-28(b) (1956) (1995 Reenactment). See also Da-
vol, Inc. v. Aguiar, 463 A.2d 170, 173-74 (R.I. 1983) (holding that the statute pro-
vides the Appellate Division with de novo review of all factual findings with the
exception of credibility determinations made by the trial judge).
47. See Lambert, 723 A.2d at 783.
48. See id.
49. Id.
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Workers' Compensation Law. Perlman v. Philip Wolfe, Haber-
dasher, 729 A.2d 673 (R.I. 1999). When an employee files a peti-
tion for benefits arising from a recurrence of a work-related injury,
and when that employee has not worked for the requisite period as
set forth in section 28-33-20.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws,
the employee bears the burden of establishing that his or her ab-
sence from the work force was not a voluntary decision.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On May 25, 1982, Stuart Perlman (Perlman) injured his back
while working for his employer, Philip Wolfe, Haberdasher (Haber-
dasher).' For several years following his injury, Perlman received
compensation benefits based on his inability to work.2 Some time
later, on the advice of its insurance company, Haberdasher con-
ducted surveillance of Perlman that resulted in a petition to review
Perlman's award.3 On January 3, 1990, the Chairman of the
Workers' Compensation Commission declared Perlman "to be no
longer totally or partially incapacitated."4 As a result of this rul-
ing, Perlman's compensation benefits were suspended.5 Perlman
never appealed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Com-
mission and he never reentered the workforce. 6
Five years later, in September of 1995, Perlman filed a peti-
tion to review the suspension of his compensation benefits.7 His
petition was based on a recurrence of the original work-related in-
jury that he allegedly sustained on August 22, 1995.8 Perlman's
petition was denied at a pre-trial hearing, but he later won at
trial.9
At trial, Perlman introduced the deposition testimony of an or-
thopedic surgeon, Dr. Spindell.' 0 Dr. Spindell was Perlman's treat-
ing physician and testified that Perlman's disability had been
continuing since 1982 and had gotten worse since his original acci-
1. See Perlman v. Philip Wolfe, Haberdasher, 729 A.2d 673 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id at 673-74.
4. Id. at 674.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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dent in May of 1982.11 To counter Dr. Spindell's testimony, Haber-
dasher introduced the deposition testimony of Dr. Willetts. 12 Dr.
Willetts was Haberdasher's examining physician and testified that
Perlman's injury had gotten better since he first examined Perl-
man in 1989.13 Dr. Willetts also testified that Perlman's injury
was related to a 1966 injury and was not caused by his 1982
injury.' 4
The trial justice found that Perlman had satisfied his burden
of proving "a return of incapacity" and reinstated his weekly com-
pensation benefits. 15 However, because Perlman had not worked
the thirteen weeks prior to August 22, 1995, the date of recurrence
of the injury, the trial judge ordered that the weekly payments be
based on the original decree awarded in May of 1982.16
Haberdasher appealed the decision of the trial justice, but the
Appellate Division affirmed. 17 The Appellate Division based its de-
cision on Lisi v. Warren Oil Co., 18 which held that "[wihen a disa-
bility is classified as a recurrence, the insurer on risk at the time of
the original injury is liable for the employee's disability."19 The Ap-
pellate Division also relied on section 28-33-20.1 of Rhode Island
General Laws.20 Pursuant to section 28-33-20.1, a "recalculation
of the average weekly wage for recurrence injuries is limited to
those cases 'where the employee has been employed for wages for
twenty-six (26) weeks prior to the date of the recurrence. Other-
wise, the earnings capacity established in the earlier order or de-
cree still controls.' ' 21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Haberdasher
argued that the Appellate Division "erred as a matter of law in its
interpretation and application" of section 28-33-20.1 of the Rhode
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. 601 A.2d 956 (R.I. 1992).
19. Perlman, 729 A.2d at 674 (quoting Lisi, 601 A.2d at 959).
20. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-20.1 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
21. Perlman,729 A.2d. at 674-75 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-20.1).
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Island General Laws.22 Haberdasher asserted that section 28-33-
20.1 is the sole method used in Rhode Island for "recalculating an
earning capacity upon a return of incapacity.., and in order to
qualify for recurrence benefits, an employee must have returned to
work for at least twenty-six weeks."23 However, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court disagreed and found that recovery should be de-
nied in cases where the employee experiences a recurrence of the
injury only when the employee voluntarily leaves the work force.24
The supreme court also relied on its recent decision in Lam-
bert v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc.25 Pursuant to Lambert, an employee's
inability to work during the thirteen weeks prior to his or her date
of incapacity does not bar an award of compensation benefits when
the employee's absence is not voluntary. 26 The Lambert court
found it absurd to deny an injured worker compensation benefits, if
through no fault of their own, they were unable to work and estab-
lish an earning capacity for the thirteen weeks prior to the date of
their incapacity.27 Following its reasoning in Lambert, the
supreme court held that:
when an employee files a petition for benefits arising from a
recurrence [of a work related injury], and when that em-
ployee has not worked for the requisite period as set forth in
§ 28-33-20.1, the employee bears the burden of establishing
that his or her absence from the work force was not
voluntary.28
Here, involuntary is defined as not due to retirement or un-
willingness to work, but because of some "non-volitional cause" be-
yond the employee's control. 29 Therefore, after affirming the
Appellate Division's finding that Perlman voluntarily chose not to
work from 1990 through 1995, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that Perlman could not receive benefits. 3 0 Because his deci-
sion to leave the work force was completely voluntary, Perlman's
inability to demonstrate an earning capacity for the requisite
22. Id. at 675.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. 723 A.2d 777 (R.I. 1999).
26. See Perlman, 729 A.2d at 675 (citing Lambert, 723 A.2d at 781).
27. See id.
28. Id. at 676.
29. Id.
30. See id.
856 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:601
twenty-six weeks prior to his date of incapacity resulted in the de-
nial of his compensation benefits.
CONCLUSION
In Perlman v. Philip Wolfe, Haberdasher, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court reaffirmed its reasoning in Lambert, and held that
when an employee files a petition for benefits arising from a recur-
rence of a work related injury, and when that employee has not
worked for the requisite period as set forth in section 28-33-20.1 of
the Rhode Island General Laws, the employee bears the burden of
establishing that his or her absence from the work force was not
voluntary. If the employee cannot satisfy this burden, workers'
compensation benefits must be denied.
Heather M. Spellman
SURVEY SECTION
Workers' Compensation Law. Smith v. Colonial Knife Co., Inc.,
731 A.2d 724 (R.I. 1999). Holiday pay should be included in the
calculation of the average weekly wage for workers' compensation
purposes pursuant to section 28-33-20 of the Rhode Island General
Laws.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On January 23, 1995, Robert T. Smith (Smith), an employee of
Colonial Knife Co., Inc. (Colonial), was injured during the course of
his employment.' Until Smith's appeal to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, he had been collecting $491.77 of weekly workers'
compensation benefits, which reflected his average weekly wage at
Colonial. 2 At trial before the Workers' Compensation Court and
later at the Appellate Division, however, Smith argued that holi-
day pay should be included in the calculation of his average weekly
wage. 3 The parties discussed how holiday pay should be calculated
and agreed that in order to be eligible for holiday pay, an employee
must have worked at Colonial for a minimum of three months prior
to the holiday.4 Additionally, the employee was required to work
the day before and the day after the holiday in order to receive
holiday pay.5 It was then stipulated that if an employee meets
these requirements, holiday pay is calculated by multiplying the
employee's hourly rate of pay by eight hours.6
The trial judge held that Smith's holiday pay should not be
included in his average weekly wage.7 The trial judge based his
decision upon the language of section 28-33-20 of the Rhode Island
General Laws,8 which specifically includes paid vacation time but
does not mention holiday pay.9 The trial judge inferred a legisla-
tive intent to not include holiday pay in the calculation of the aver-
age weekly wage. 10 The Appellate Division affirmed the trial
court, also finding it to be the legislature's intent to exclude holi-
1. See Smith v. Colonial Knife Co., Inc., 731 A.2d 724, 725 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-20 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
9. See Smith, 731 A.2d at 725.
10. See id.
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day pay from the average weekly wage because it did not specifi-
cally list it in section 28-33-20.11
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Smith argued
that the trial court and the Appellate Division erred in their inter-
pretation of section 28-33-20 and therefore his holiday pay should
be included in his average weekly wage. 12 Smith also argued that
the failure to mention holiday pay in section 28-33-20 indicates a
legislative intent to treat holiday pay as either gross wages or va-
cation pay.13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that "[iun remaining
consistent with the goals of workers' compensation, we are of the
opinion that holiday pay should be included in the calculation of
gross wages."' 4 The court found that to conclude otherwise would
cause an injured employee to lose compensation based on the tim-
ing of his injury. 15 This holding was based on the purpose of the
Workers' Compensation Act, which is to provide an effective means
of support and protection for injured workers. 16 The court then
concluded that to deny holiday pay because of the timing of an em-
ployee's injury is contrary to public policy and the goals behind the
enactment of the Workers' Compensation Act.' 7
CONCLUSION
In Smith v. Colonial Knife Co., Inc., the Rhode Island Supreme
Court determined that the legislative intent of section 28-33-20 of
the Rhode Island General Laws is to provide the employee with an
equitable formula for the calculation of benefits while also provid-
ing protection for the employer against the possibility of excessive
claims brought by a newly hired employee. Excluding holiday pay
from the calculation of gross wages provides an inequitable solu-
tion for an employee who is injured at work during or immediately
11. See id
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. See id. (citing Saddon v. Skin Medic & Surgery Ctrs. of R.I., Inc., 713 A.2d
777, 779-80 (R.I. 1998)).
17. See id. at 726 (citing Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 129 (R.I.
1994)).
20001 SURVEY SECTION 859
after a holiday season. Therefore, the court held that pursuant to
section 28-33-20, holiday pay will be included in the calculation of
the employee's gross wages.
Heather M. Spellman
